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ABSTRACT
Objective To evaluate the policy making process,
implementation by NHS organisations, and patients’ and
carers’ experiences of efforts to introduce an internet
accessible personal electronic health record
(HealthSpace) in a public sector healthcare system.
Design Mixed method, multilevel case study.
Setting English National Health Service; the basic
HealthSpace technology (available throughout England)
and the advanced version (available in a few localities
where this optionhad been introduced)were considered.
MainoutcomemeasuresNationalstatisticsoninvitations
sent, HealthSpace accounts created, and interviews and
ethnographic observation of patients and carers. Data
analysis was informed by a socio-technical approach
which considered macro and micro influences on both
adoption and non-adoption of innovations, and by the
principles of critical discourse analysis.
Participants56patientsandcarers(ofwhom21openeda
basicHealthSpaceaccount,20haddiabetesbutwerenot
initially using HealthSpace, and 15 used advanced
HealthSpace accounts to exchange messages with their
generalpractitioner),3000pagesofdocuments(policies,
strategies, business plans, minutes of meetings,
correspondence), observational field notes, and 160
interviews with policy makers, project managers, and
clinical staff.
Results Between 2007 and October 2010, 172950
people opened a basic HealthSpace account. 2913
(0.13% of those invited) opened an advanced account,
comparedwith5-10%ofthepopulationanticipatedinthe
original business case. Overall, patients perceived
HealthSpace as neither useful nor easy to use and its
functionality aligned poorly with their expectations and
self management practices. Those who used email-style
messaging were positive about its benefits, but
enthusiasm beyond three early adopter clinicians was
low, and fewer than 100 of 30000 patients expressed
interest. Policy makers’ hopes that “deploying”
HealthSpace would lead to empowered patients,
personalised care, lower NHS costs, better data quality,
and improved health literacy were not realised over the
three year evaluation period.
Conclusion Unless personal electronic health records
align closely with people’s attitudes, self management
practices, identified information needs, and the wider
care package (including organisational routines and
incentive structures for clinicians), the risk that they will
be abandoned or not adopted at all is substantial.
Conceptualising such records dynamically (as
components of a socio-technical network) rather than
statically (as containers for data) and employing user
centreddesigntechniquesmightimprovetheirchancesof
adoptionanduse.Thefindingsraisequestionsabouthow
eHealth programmes in England are developed and
approved at policy level.
INTRODUCTION
InBritainasinmanyothercountries,theprevalenceof
long term conditions is increasing but the budget for
providing services is falling in real terms.
1 Patients’
involvement in their care is viewed by some as both
inherentlydesirable(empowering)andpotentiallycost
saving.
2 The vision for informed, self managing
patients as active partners in healthcare represents a
major cultural shift from the paternalistic, disease
focusedmodelsofthepast(fig1).
34Personalelectronic
health records, managed by patients and interfacing
with clinician held records, are seen as having a key
role in the new care model, by facilitating storage and
exchangeof information, promotingengagement with
self management,and supportingcontinuity of care,
5-9
although they raise practical, ethical, legal, clinical,
technical, cultural, and financial challenges.
610-15
Provisionofpersonalelectronichealthrecordsasan
integral part of a wider care package may reduce clin-
ician workload and overall healthcare costs. The US
health maintenance organisation Kaiser Permanente,
for example, offers an electronic record system that
includes “My Health Manager,” a customisable portal
through which members may access parts of their cen-
trally held record, including laboratory results, drugs,
allergies, immunisations, past clinic visits, and key
diagnoses; patients can email their physician through
a secure connection.
1617 By mid-2008, 2.4 million of
Kaiser’s 8.7 million members had registered for My
Health Manager, most commonly for repeat prescrip-
tions. Use of the system was associated with up to 10%
fewervisitstothephysicianandasignificantreduction
in telephone calls.
18 A survey of members who were
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BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com page 1 of 11actively using this technology showed that most per-
ceived it as useful and easy to use.
16
Other studies, however, have shown slow uptake of
using personal electronic health records by both
patients and clinicians, low levels of awareness, and
unrealistic expectations.
1019 The material properties
and functionality of the technology seem to be impor-
tant determinants of uptake and use.
1320 Some doctors
have expressed concern that “untethered” personal
electronic health records (that is, those not linked to
clinician held records or embedded in a wider care
package)maypromoteunhealthyconsumerismrather
than empowerment.
21 Microsoft and Google each
recently launched a personal electronic health record
(HealthVaultandGoogleHealth,respectively),raising
questions about how people’s use of such records
mightoccurindependentlyofaprofessionallyledclin-
ical care package.
HealthSpace,aninternetaccessiblepersonalelectro-
nic health record, was introduced in the English
NationalHealthServicein2007,inspiredbytheKaiser
model.
22 It is an evolving technology; different func-
tions came on stream at different times, and further
changes are planned (box 1). Using a basic Health-
Space account, people may enter values (such as their
blood pressure readings) and record healthcare
appointments on a calendar. Through an advanced
account they can gain secure access to their summary
care record (a nationally stored summary of their
medical details drawn from the general practitioner
record
23), book outpatient appointments, and
exchange email style electronic messages with their
clinician using a secure link called Communicator.
Figure 2 shows the main screen of HealthSpace. Mod-
ifications to the HealthSpace user interface were made
over the study period but the underlying design and
functionality were essentially unchanged.
We have previously reported a survey of NHS
patients’ attitudes to the clinician controlled summary
care record (more than two thirds definitely wanted
such a record) and to HealthSpace (fewer than one in
four considered trying it).
24 We assessed the extent to
which HealthSpace had been adopted and used in the
three years after its introduction in 2007, the extent to
which the benefits anticipated by policy makers had
been realised, explanations for non-adoption and
abandonment of HealthSpace, and lessons learnt
from the introduction and use of personal electronic
health records more generally.
METHODS
Management and governance
This study, part of the independent evaluation of the
summary care record and HealthSpace programmes
commissioned by the Department of Health, is
reported in detail elsewhere.
25 The evaluation was
overseen by an external steering group chaired by a
layperson, with representation from key stakeholders,
includingpatients,professionalbodies,academicinsti-
tutions, and Connecting for Health, which at the time
of the study was the “arm’s length” agency of the
Department of Health responsible for implementing
the National Programme for IT. Potential participants
were initially approached by someone not directly
involved in the research.
Theoretical and methodological approach
We undertook a mixed method, multilevel case study
covering the policy making process, implementation
by NHS organisations, and experiences of patients
and carers. We followed published guidance for the
evaluation of programmes
26 and interpretive field stu-
dies of complex technologies.
27 We refined these gen-
eric approaches into a more specific theory driven
methodology, described in detail elsewhere.
28 In
short, we combined qualitative and quantitative
approaches to build a rich picture of the case (Health-
Space), making five key assumptions: electronic
records do not merely store information but actively
shape and constrain care; people and technologies
are linked in complex and dynamic networks, hence
it is more useful to study the process of socio-technical
change than the implementation of a technology; both
people and technologies in a network “act,” but not in
the same way (for example, people have values and
feelings whereas technologies do not); everyone’s ill-
nesshas uniquefeatures,hence clinicalcare (including
self care) can never be fully standardised; and a tech-
nology programme should be studied at both the
macro level (for example, national policy, healthcare
system, wider social norms, and expectations) and the
micro level (for example, particular experiences of
patients and professionals).
Data sources and sampling frame
Thetablesummarisesourdataset.Aswellasreviewing
national registration statistics, we studied the adoption
and non-adoption of HealthSpace by 56 patients and
carers,interviewed160staffinnationalandlocalorga-
nisations, and collected 3000 pages of documents to
build a picture of the programme in context.
Viewed as
better care
Time
Viewed as
worse care
Secondary
care
“Industrial age” healthcare “Information age” healthcare
Professionals
as partners
   Professionals
as authorities
Self managing patient,
supported by technologies
Care network (family,
friends, peer support)
Tertiary
care  
Primary care
Self care or no care
Fig 1 | Policy vision of specialist driven care shifting to patient driven care as information age
replaces industrial age. Adapted from Ferguson
8
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AdoptionofHealthSpaceshouldideallybeconsidered
in relation to whether people were aware of its exis-
tence and whether they had a summary care record,
since the advanced HealthSpace account is designed
to access the summary care record. Using aggregated
data collated nationally by Connecting for Health, we
monitored the number of personal letters sent to peo-
ple with summary care records inviting them to create
an advanced HealthSpace account and the number of
basicandadvancedaccountscreatednationally.Itwas
not possible to monitor how many people were
reached by communications about HealthSpace
through national and local mass media (for example,
newspapers, radio, public access website),
29 nor how
the national data were broken down by personal fac-
tors such as age or sex.
The policy context
Weanalysedpolicies,strategies,andbusinessplansfor
HealthSpace at two levels. Firstly, we considered their
content in a conventional way by assessing the ideas
and facts presented. Secondly, we drew on the princi-
ples of critical discourse analysis to consider the lan-
guage, format, and focus of the document, with a
view to exploring underlying assumptions and ideolo-
gies (see guiding questions in box 2).
30
Adoption and use of HealthSpace
Thestudydesignandsamplingweresignificantlyinflu-
enced by the low response rate to our original recruit-
ment strategy. Indeed, the study raised important
methodological challenges about how to study non-
adoption of an innovation—a task that is essential for
overcoming pro-innovation bias in the literature but
for which there is no established methodology and
few examples from previous research.
31 We sought to
recruit people seeking to use HealthSpace through
“frontoffice”registration centresprovided byprimary
care trusts, but because no one agreed to participate
(mainly because front office registrations were orders
of magnitude lower than expected) we expanded
recruitmenttogeneralpractices,patientorganisations,
organisations dealing with ethnic communities, and a
localdevelopmentschemeforhealthtrainers(inwhich
lay people are trained to support others in their com-
munityto make positivechoices aboutlifestyle). Thus,
although we had originally planned to study people
who had spontaneously signed up for HealthSpace,
our final sample comprised people who consented to
try this technology as part of a research project.
We sought to observe participants using Health-
Space in a setting where they felt most comfortable.
Many chose to be seen in their homes (table). We
observed them registering for a basic HealthSpace
account and viewing health data on it. When consent
was given, we audiotaped interviews and the partici-
pant’s efforts to use the technology and used screen
capture software to gain multimedia data. We also
asked the participants to talk us through their actions
in real time.
Studying the design-reality gap in HealthSpace
An early finding that participants appeared frustrated
with HealthSpace prompted us to explore the gap
between design and reality—that is, the difference
between the assumptions built into the technology
and how people actually managed their health and ill-
nesses. To that end, and because of low recruitment of
HealthSpace users, we extended our design and sam-
plingframetoincludeadetailedethnographicstudyof
people who were not using HealthSpace. We chose
peoplewithdiabetesasthisconditionhadbeenflagged
instrategydocumentsasparticularlysuited toself care
via HealthSpace. We began by recruiting from a local
diabetes group and a clinical diabetesservice and used
snowballing(askingparticipantsiftheyknewsomeone
else with the condition) to extend our sample. We
aimed for maximum variety in age, sex, ethnicity,
health literacy, IT literacy, stage and severity of condi-
tion, presence of other illnesses, and extent of family
support.
Drawing on the principle that technology design is
usefully informed by a close analysis of the use for
which it is intended,
32 one of us (SH) undertook
between one and three periods of detailed ethno-
graphicobservation(2-5hourseach)oneachof20peo-
plewithdiabetes(12ofwhomalsohadotherlongterm
conditions). The researcher shadowed them as they
went about theirdaily life,noting howtheirconditions
influenced their activity, what information and com-
munication needs the researcher identified, whether
the participant identified these as such, and how they
dealt with them.
Box 1: HealthSpace technology
As with most software, HealthSpace is an evolving technology. At any time in the
evaluation, multiple versions of it existed—including the version that people were actually
using, the version that had been approved and was undergoing technical development
and limited piloting, and one or more versions that were at the design stage.
A preliminary version of HealthSpace was introduced in 2007, the main features of which
were a basic account on to which patients could enter key personal data (for example,
weight, blood pressure) and an advanced account through which patients could access
their summary care record.
HealthSpace Extension
By the time we evaluated the preliminary version of the technology in 2008, a business
plan for HealthSpace Extension had been submitted. This proposed a more sophisticated
product with greater functionality and more extensive links to other parts of the National
Programme for IT (for example, booking of appointments, requests for repeat
prescriptions, and a secure email link). However, the full functionality of HealthSpace
Extension was never developed.
Enhanced version of HealthSpace
In 2009 an enhanced version of HealthSpace was introduced, which included
Communicator, a secure email style messaging connection to the patient’s general
practice.
Future upgrade
We were advised that a further upgrade with extended functionality (still to be finalised at
the time of writing) was planned for late 2010. We understand this is likely to include a
facility to order repeat prescriptions online and a fully online registration process.
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usingHealthSpace.Inthethreewhoagreed,wesought
to observe directly how HealthSpace supported or
could have supported their efforts to self manage
their diabetes and any other conditions. In the 17
who did not want to try HealthSpace, we sought to
identify and explore mismatches between its design
features (or the assumptions that the participant had
madeaboutthese)andthelivedrealityof“selfmanage-
ment.” We noted other people, such as relatives,
friends, peers, the general practitioner, and specialist
nurses, who helped the participant manage their con-
ditions and also noted the technologies (such as blood
glucose meter, insulin pump, telephone, and internet)
that they or their carers used alongside or, more
usually, instead of HealthSpace.
The participant was asked to produce a drawing of
“how diabetes affects my life.” We used this to help
map the socio-technical network of people and tech-
nologies that they drew upon in managing their condi-
tion. We made brief contemporaneous notes while
shadowing and immediately afterwards annotated
these and added our own reflections, a task that some-
times took several hours. Comments by other mem-
bers of the research team on these field notes
informedsubsequentperiodsofobservationandques-
tions to the participant.
Studying adoption and use of email-style messaging
Communicator(thesecuremessageexchangefunction
of HealthSpace) was piloted in three general practices.
Patients with a range of acute and chronic conditions
were invited to try out the technology both through
advertising, such as on the practice website and notice
board, and opportunistically (by their general practi-
tioners during consultations). Practice staff provided
help with registering for an advanced HealthSpace
account if needed and asked the participant if they
were willing to be interviewed by our team. We
recruited15participantsinthissubstudyandarranged
afacetofaceinterviewintheparticipant’shomeor,for
those who preferred it, a telephone interview. We
assured them that responses would be treated
confidentially, and anonymised findings fed back to
their general practitioner and the national Health-
Space implementation team. We began with a list of
semistructured questions (box 3) but encouraged an
unstructured narrative if this was forthcoming. In con-
senting participants, we watched them sending and
opening messages.
Analysis of empirical data
Ourdatasetcomprisedquantitativestatisticsonuptake
(which were not amenable to further analysis) plus
large amounts of qualitative data of different types,
such as field notes, transcripts of interviews, emails,
and letters. We read and annotated free text data,
developed provisional analytical categories, and itera-
tively refined these in team discussions using the con-
stant comparative method—that is, comparing each
new item of data with an emerging picture of the case
as a whole.
33 We used narrative as a sense making and
synthesis tool to weave together the quantitative and
qualitative findings into a rich picture of HealthSpace,
which depicted key events and upstream causes while
also conveying ambiguities and uncertainties.
34 We
sent drafts of our interpretation to those patients and
carers (threeof 56)who were interestedin seeingthem
and presented draft findings to participating primary
care trusts and national policy makers.
RESULTS
Adoption rates for basic and advanced HealthSpace
As of end October 2010, 172950 people in England
had loggedon tothe HealthSpace websiteand entered
personaldetailstocreateabasicaccount.Thesefigures
were impossible to interpret further as the proportion
of the population who knew about HealthSpace at the
time, and the proportion of people who actually
entered any data or used their basic account, are
unknown.
More robust data were available on advanced
accounts. As of the end of October 2010, 2442215
people in England, all of whom had had (or were
about to have) a summary care record created for
them, had received a letter inviting them to open an
advanced HealthSpace account. Of these, 11953
(0.49%) had completed the first step to opening such
an account (that is, logged on to the Connecting for
Health website and downloaded a form); 3933
(0.16% of those invited) had taken the form to a front
office to have it processed and 2913 (0.13%) had acti-
vated their advanced HealthSpace account.
Policy and strategy
HealthSpace was originally conceptualised as part of
the National Programme for IT, an ambitious, cen-
trally led programme (estimated cost £12.4bn;
€14.3bn; $19.9bn) that aimed to improve informatics
support, encourage standardisation, and centralise
procurement of information systems in the NHS
while at the same time redesigning care systems
around the patient.
35 Policy documents published in
2005-8 were written in a hopeful, upbeat style and
Box 2: Examples of questions asked in discourse analysis of policy and strategic
documents for HealthSpace (adapted from Blommaert
30)
Questions used to guide a detailed critical analysis of policy documents, national strategy
documents, and the national business case were:
 Where is the text historically located and in what context was it written?
 What is the text being used to accomplish?
 Who is the author and what is his or her relationship with the text?
 Who are the active agents referred to in the text?
 What are the author’s points of departure—that is, what does he or she assume as
taken for granted?
 What rhetorical arguments are proposed—f o re x a m p l e ,w h a to p t i o n sa r ep r e s e n t e d
and in what way is one option depicted as better than others?
 What experts are invoked, and where does their expertise come from?
 What literary devices, such as metaphors, are used?
RESEARCH
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nalisation of care, patient empowerment, reduced
NHS costs, patient driven improvements in data qual-
ity,andimprovedhealthliteracy—thatis,theavailabil-
ity of HealthSpace would improve people’s ability to
understand and manage their health)
35-39:
HealthSpaceisanexcellentadditiontotheSCR[Sum-
mary Care Record] programme and has huge poten-
tial to improve the safety and efficiency of care by
allowing patients to check the accuracy of their SCR
and to access detailed information about their own
health. In order to take fuller advantage of Health-
Space, we recommend that Connecting for Health
trial the use of HealthSpace for patients, particularly
those with long-term conditions, to record their own
measurements of key health information
House of Commons Health Committee report on the
electronic patient record 2007, page 43
39
Atriplepackage,deliveredcentrallyandcomprising
HealthSpace, the summary care record, and NHS
Choices (a website of health information and details
of how to access services, www.nhs.uk) was presented
in strategy documents as the solution to a particular
problem (lack of integration across the NHS leading
to fragmentation of care, inefficiency, and risk). This
package was depicted as necessarily indivisible and
linked to efficiency savings:
HealthSpace needs to be developed in a way which
enables it to form an element of the portfolio of public
online services complementary to the other elements.
That portfolio package must provide services to the
patient that are personalised, secure and apparently
seamless. Without those features, which can only be
delivered by all the elements being offered in a joined
up manner, the take up of these services will be
damaged with the risk of wasted investment
Strategicoutline case forHealthSpace extension,page
13
40
Strategy documents portrayed implementation of
the HealthSpace programme in overtly technical and
managerial terms (“technology development”, “pro-
curement”, “deployment”). The main active agents in
such documents were the Department of Health, Con-
necting for Health, software suppliers, policy itself
(“policy envisages . . . ,”“ policy drivers”), and the
HealthSpace technology (which would “deliver bene-
fits”). Somewhat ironically, patients were referred to
generically, collectively, and passively, such as “the
public” and even “the mass market,” who were
depicted as the recipients of HealthSpace’s benefits.
It was anticipated that although patients might have
difficulties using HealthSpace these would generally
be remedied by technical modifications to the soft-
ware.
Strategicand businesscasesforHealthSpacedidnot
mention patients’ expectations of personal electronic
health records, motivation to use them, or current self
care practices. They acknowledged that segmentation
ofthetargetpopulationwaspossibleandidentifieddia-
betes as a paradigm condition that could test proof of
concept for the technology, although there were no
plans to adapt the design for specific user groups or
use cases.
The main experts identified in strategy documents
were software developers and national implementa-
tion leads; neither clinical nor patient expertise was
mentioned. A lengthy risk assessment focused exclu-
sively on technical and procedural risks (such as
“inadequate specification of requirement by NHS,”
“information governance and data security require-
ments [may] change,” and even that uptake of Health-
Space accounts would outstrip capacity to process
applications
40). Risks linked to people’s feelings, moti-
vation, and values (for example, lack of interest or a
perception by patients that the software was not help-
ful) were not listed.
Early policy enthusiasm for HealthSpace seemed to
wane after experiences in 2007-8. The business case
submitted in 2008 for introducing extended function-
ality (see box 1) was not approved by the Department
of Health because, according to senior policy makers
interviewed for this study, it was considered too high
risk, although we were not told why. A business case
for a scaled-down version of the programme (not sup-
plied to us but which we understand cost £18m com-
pared with an original £98m) was given one year’s
approval from January 2010 from the “Darzi” funding
stream, which lay outside the National Programme for
Box 3: Prompt sheet for exploring how people used HealthSpace or Communicator
The prompt sheet was adapted flexibly depending on points raised by the interviewee.
 Personal details, such as background, age, sex, ethnicity, work status
 How does the participant rate their own health literacy or knowledge of health issues?
 How does the participant rate their own IT literacy? How much use do they make of
computers? (Explore use of IT at home or at work, such as internet banking, shopping,
communicating)
 How aware are they of health information sites and do they use these? Has this
changed since starting to use HealthSpace or Communicator?
 If willing to discuss, what is the nature of their medical condition and frequency of
attendance at the general practice, clinics, etc?
 How and how often did they communicate with their doctor or general practice before
using Communicator, and how has this changed?
 HowwasHealthSpaceorCommunicatorintroducedto them andhowwereitspotential
benefits and drawbacks described to them?
 Registration process: how did the participant register for a basic or advanced account?
Helped by whom? How easy was registration and what issues emerged at this stage?
 What was theparticipant’s expectations of HealthSpace or Communicator before using
it?
 Whathasbeentheiractualexperienceofusingthetechnology?Promptforexamplesof
actual usage, especially communications from person to doctor and vice versa
 What type of patient does this participant think would benefit most or least from using
this technology?
 What would they change?
 How would they feel if this service was withdrawn?
RESEARCH
BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com page 5 of 11IT and was oriented to supporting self management of
long term conditions.
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Implementation of HealthSpace by NHS organisations
HealthSpace was initially introduced in two localities,
whichwereearlyadoptersofthesummarycarerecord.
Implementation work for both these technologies in
NHS organisations was complex and labour intensive
and it competedforresourcesand stafftime with other
policy must dos.
2329 Key tasks for local teams included
delivering a public information campaign, training
staff, and running a front office to process patients’
applications for advanced HealthSpace accounts.
Project leads from participating NHS organisations
repeatedlyraisedconcernswithConnectingforHealth
in monthly management meetings about the low
uptake of advanced HealthSpace accounts, since the
benefits predicted (such as lower NHS costs and
patient driven improvements to data quality) could
not possibly be achieved unless the technology was
used. The original strategy had assumed in 2007 that
“significantlymorethan5%”oftheover-16population
(page8)
40andin2008that“approximately10%”ofthis
population (page 13)
22 would open and use advanced
HealthSpace accounts.
Low uptake of HealthSpace seemed to be partly
because of patients’ limited interest
24 and partly
because the registration process was cumbersome
and bureaucratic:
They need to come in to, like the front office, because
we check all their identification documents that they
need.IhavetosigntosaythatI’veseenthethreeproofs
of ID. One’s got to be a photograph, like a passport.
One’s got to be, to have a proof of address so that can
bea driving licence or a utility bill, something like that.
A n dt h e nt h e y ’ve got to have a third one, which is defi-
nitely like a utility bill that’sc u r r e n t ;i t ’s got to have
b e e ni s s u e di nt h el a s t3m o n t h s[...] .W h e nI ’ve
okayed it, they sign the form and then I give them—
it’s like a little credit card but it’sg o tc o d e so n —and
when I’ve sent the paperwork off to the [national]
back office, they then write to the patient and confirm
that they’ve now got their advanced registration and
send them a code that they work out with this card,
and that gives them access to their record then
Administrator, primary care trust HealthSpace front office
We were informed by Connecting for Health that a
future upgrade to HealthSpace will allow online regis-
tration.
Efforts by patients to use basic HealthSpace
Few people who registered for a basic HealthSpace
account were willing to be interviewed. The 21 people
inthissubstudywhotriedusingHealthSpacefounditof
limitedvalue.Noneenteredanyhealthdataontoitand
none intended to continue using it in its present form,
although some anticipated that a future upgraded ver-
sion might be more worth while. One reason for aban-
donment was poor ease of use (for example, what was
described as a clunky and counter intuitive access
page), which we do not report in detail here as subse-
quent upgrades improved these features. But the main
concern of participants was the fundamental design of
the HealthSpace technology and the mismatch
between this and their expectations. Despite back-
groundliteratureandexplanationsbyresearchersmak-
ingcleartopotentialusersthattheywouldneedtoenter
their health data themselves, all 21 people interviewed
were disappointed and some were angry that they
found an “empty” record. Seven of the 21 expected to
see their entire general practice held medical record
and two expected to see hospital records as well.
Participantsinthissubstudywhohadachronicillness
did notseebasicHealthSpaceasaddingvalue inmana-
ging their condition. Some pointed out that self moni-
toring of health data involves a complex interaction
between patient and clinician and that the process of
entering and accessing data cannot be meaningfully
separated from the wider care relationship:
I don’t know why you would document it here,
because there’s no one else looking at it, there’s only
you looking at it. [ . . . ] You could ask your nurse and
then put it in your target. ‘What’s a good level, what’s
a good cholesterol to have?’ and then put it in a target.
I don’t know whether people would use it
Participant who tried basic HealthSpace once
Summary of data sources for evaluation of HealthSpace
Research focus Data sources
Adoption rate of HealthSpace National statistics, produced by participating primary care trusts and
collatedbyConnectingforHealth,updatedweekly,onnumberofpeople
who had been sent lettersaboutHealthSpace and number of basicand
advanced HealthSpace accounts created
User experience of HealthSpace
registration process and early use
Interviewswith21peoplewhohadregisteredforaHealthSpaceaccount
or expressed interest in doing so; observation of them accessing their
account and using or trying to use it to manage their illness and risk
factors. Nine were interviewed in their homes, seven in a community
centre,threeintheirgeneralpracticesurgery,andtwoattheirworkplace
Exploratory study of HealthSpace’s
design-reality gap for people with
chronic illness
Interviews with and ethnographic observation of 20 people with
diabetes (12 of whom also had other illnesses), recruited from a forum
for patients with diabetes, hospital clinics, a community group, and
snowballing from this sample. We shadowed the participant for two or
three periods of 2-5 hours each at home and work, noting information
needs as they arose and how these were tackled by the participant.
Three of these 20 agreed to try HealthSpace as part of the research
Use of email-style messaging
(“Communicator”)b yp a t i e n t sa n d
carers
Interviewswith13patientsandtwocarerswhohadbeeninvitedbytheir
general practitioner to participate in the Communicator pilot (eight face
to face and seven by telephone at the participant’s request). In face to
face interviews we observed use of (or attempts to use) Communicator
Experience of Communicator by
general practice staff
Six interviews and 10 informal meetings or email exchanges with
clinicians, managers, and reception staff at three participating general
practices
Policy background and perspective of
Connecting for Health
Policy documents, strategy and business cases, committee papers,
internal reports, external communications. Interviews and meetings
with Connecting for Health staff. Observation notes from boards,
committees, and conferences
Perspective of strategic health
authorities and primary care trusts
Interviews and meetings with senior executives, project managers, and
IT managers. Observation notes and papers from meetings about
summary care record and HealthSpace
Perspective of citizens and public Interviewswithrepresentativesandfieldnotesfrommeetingsofpatient
organisations that were considering the implications of HealthSpace.
Press articles. Material produced by groups campaigning for civil
liberties
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their advanced HealthSpace account to access their
summary care record. This is perhaps unsurprising
given that only around one person in 1000 registered
foranadvancedaccountandthatanunknownpropor-
tion of those actually used it. One informant described
the “sleeping gym membership” phenomenon: regis-
tering for HealthSpace, accessing it once, then losing
interest. Nobody interviewed about their use of
HealthSpace thought it had changed their use of NHS
services.
The design-reality gap
The20participantsinthissubstudyrangedinagefrom
11 to 69. All had diabetes and 12 also had other condi-
tions (hypertension, heart disease, kidney disease,
thyroiddisease,chronic lungdisease,arthritis,chronic
disability from stroke, visual impairment). Eleven had
leftschoolattheminimumschoolleavingage,13were
female, and two were from minority ethnic groups.
Three of the 20 agreed to try HealthSpace, all of
whom abandoned it soon after first accessing it and
declared that they were not interested in using it
again. Others either were not motivated to reflect on
theprogressoftheirconditionorthoughtthatthiswasa
task for their doctor or nurse:
What would I do with that information [data entered
on HealthSpace] then? It’s there for somebody else to
analyse but I wouldn’t bother with it
Participant with diabetes who chose not to try Health-
Space
Some people in this subsample had no access to
computers or the internet at home. More commonly,
participants saw these technologies as serving other
purposes in their lives (games, shopping, social net-
working). Some were already using or exploring
other ways of documenting and monitoring their con-
dition, such as paper (especially the widely used blood
glucosediariessuppliedfreebymanufacturersofmon-
itoring devices) or bespoke software (for example,
Excel spreadsheet). One participant who had tried
HealthSpace, later became interested in downloads
for a digital personal organiser (iPhone apps) and
found these more fit for purpose than HealthSpace.
This participant later emailed us (unsolicited) a struc-
turedtableofbloodglucosereadingsovertime,gener-
ated using a digital application costing around £5, and
commented that this simple task would not have been
possible using HealthSpace.
Manyparticipants’informationandcommunication
needs were not primarily for codified data (for exam-
ple, blood glucose levels) but for practical knowledge
of how to live with their condition and for emotional
support. They tended to get this from other people,
such as relatives, local diabetes support group, Face-
book, and a nurse led telephone helpline. One partici-
pant showed us an online self help group hosted by a
charityforpatientswithdiabetes,inwhichpatientsand
carers exchanged informal stories and tips on topics
such as insulin dosing, handling small children with
diabetes, and negotiating with health professionals to
get the tests and interventions recommended in guide-
lines.
Our ethnographic observations of participants’
efforts to self manage showed that these were some-
times constrained by poverty, an adverse physical
environment (for example, poor housing, overcrowd-
ing), major family stress, or serious disabilities related
or unrelated to their condition, such as depression or
stroke. Monitoring and managing long term condi-
tions competed with these other problems for emo-
tional and material resources and was rarely top of
the priority list. In this context, HealthSpace with its
complex registration procedure, password controlled
access,andselfcompletiondatafieldswasdescribedas
“faffy” or (more commonly) not considered at all.
The message exchange function
Despite personal invitations, letters, posters, and
“what’s new” messages on practice websites, fewer
than 100 patients (of a combined list size of around
30000) in the three participating practices expressed
aninterestinusingtheCommunicatormessagingfunc-
tion over a six month period. They were given the
paperwork to send off to open an advanced Health-
Space account. It is not known how many completed
this as the general practitioner is not notified when a
patient opens an account. Twenty people who had
opened advanced accounts agreed for their details to
bepassedtous,andofthese,13wantedtoparticipatein
the study. In addition, we interviewed two carers who
helped people use Communicator (or used it on their
behalf).Ageofthe 15participantsin thissubstudyran-
ged from 25 to 77 (median 48); 10 were female; three
Fig 2 | Access screen for HealthSpace, showing link to summary care record
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mainland Europe. Most rated their own IT literacy as
mediumorhighandalmostallattributedtheirrelevant
skills to IT training received at work.
This small and select group of users described the
advanced HealthSpace registration process as “pretty
straightforward” and the use of Communicator as
“easy if you can use email,” though two had had their
applications turned down by the national back office
for reasons that were unclear. Those we observed
appearedcomfortable and skilled in usingthe technol-
ogy. Two carers said that the patient did not have the
skills to register or use the technology themselves, and
another participant (visually impaired) needed a part-
ner’s help because the grid card was not available in
large print.
UsersofCommunicatorsawthistechnologyasoffer-
ing continuity of care with a general practitioner who
was popular (hence hard to get an appointment with)
andwhoonlyworkedparttime.OnethoughtthatCom-
municatorhadgiventhem“afulltimepersonalGPallto
myself.” For many, emotional continuity with “their”
general practitioner was more significant than transfer
of particular items of knowledge or advice:
Myhairstartedtofallout,andIwentoutandgotawig.
DrNrepliedit’sagoodideatogetawig.I’mnotdoing
a long rigmarole, and it’s not that I’ve got a problem,
I’mjustlettingherknowhowthingsaregoing.It’snice
that she knows about the wig
Communicator user with a recent diagnosis of cancer
(CP12)
Some participants considered Communicator a
safety measure for use in emergencies, despite having
apparently been instructed not to use it in this way:
In an emergency, I would email.
[Researcher suggests this is inadvisable as doctor only
works two days a week in surgery]
In an emergency it would only work during those two
days, but on other days we’d have to use the normal
method, ringing up
Communicator user (CP05)
ContrarytoexpectationsthatCommunicatorwould
increasepatients’autonomy,someseemedtouseitasa
means of becoming more dependent on their general
practitioner, seeking instructions or affirmation when
they might otherwise have made their own decision:
I was quite impressed, I think it’s wonderful to be able
to typea messagetomy doctorandhe cananswerme:
‘Do X Y or Z’. I suppose I have blind faith in my doc-
tor. I’ve never had the inclination into looking up the
details of what my medication consists of. […] I ask
doctor if it’s safe to take with the other medicines
Communicator user (CP04)
Some participants considered that their general
practitioner “didn’t mind” receiving messages from
them; they sent several a week and one checked their
account several times daily to see if the doctor had
replied.Somethoughtthatemailingtheirgeneralprac-
titioner directly enabled them to bypass a busy
appointment system or negotiate treatment that
would otherwise be against the rules (such as asking
to attend for flu vaccination outside the flu clinic).
Others felt uncomfortable using Communicator, used
it rarely, and were concerned that they might offend
the doctor (for example, by using the wrong form of
address) or intrude on his or her private time:
I know myself how emails encroach on your time, my
gutreactionishowisthedoctorgoingtocopewiththis
w o r k l o a d ?[...]T ob ehonest, I fear for the other
doctors in the practice if this was foisted on them!
Partnerofcommunicatoruser,whowould“never”use
it himself
All three general practitioners who participated in
the Communicator pilot were initially enthusiasts for
the technology; two were employed part time by Con-
nectingforHealthandsatonthenationalsteeringcom-
mittee for HealthSpace. Perhaps because of low
volumes they did not allocate specific time slots for
answering emails from patients nor did they introduce
formalsystemsin the practicetosupportCommunica-
toruse.Allhadlimitedsuccessinpersuadingtheirpart-
ners or other general practitioners to try
Communicator and thought that although some
patients had undoubtedly benefited from “improved
access,” uptake overall had been lower than anti-
cipated.
DISCUSSION
This multilevel case study has shown that the Health-
Space personal electronic health record was poorly
taken up by people in England, most of whom per-
ceived it as neither useful nor easy to use. They were
disappointed with the amount and type of data avail-
able,theneedtoenterdatathemselves,andthelimited
options for sharing these data with their clinician.
Enthusiasm from patients and clinicians for Health-
Space’s secure messaging function was low, although
a few patients who appeared to have high IT literacy
found it both useful and easy to use. Policy makers’
hopes that HealthSpace would lead to personalised
care, lower NHS costs, better data quality, improved
health literacy, and greater empowerment were not
realised, not least because the technology was not
adopted to a major extent and our findings raised the
possibility that email-style messaging might reduce
autonomy in some patients.
These findings must be interpreted cautiously given
the limitations of our patient sample. Although we
made efforts to recruit a larger sample of respondents
who had spontaneously chosen to adopt HealthSpace
and who used it regularly, our final sample was small
and consisted mainly of people who had never used it
or only did so because we had asked them. They are
thusunlikelytorepresent“real”HealthSpaceusers(for
example, their attitudes contrast noticeably with those
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licly in information campaigns about the benefits of
HealthSpace in managing their long term condition),
but their reactions may be broadly representative of
non-users.
The four main possibilities for the limited success of
the HealthSpace programme to date are flawed con-
cept, flawed product design, flawed implementation
and embedding, and flawed timing—that is, people
are not ready for this type of personal health record.
Some support exists for all these possibilities, the indi-
vidualimpactofwhichmayhavemultipliedtoexplain
the dramatic differences between uptake of Health-
Space in England and that of technologiessuch asKai-
ser’s My Health Manager in the United States.
18
HealthSpace was conceptualised more as a passive
container for data than as a technology that could
actively shape care. Whereas My Health Manager
was closely integrated into the overall Kaiser care
package, the basic HealthSpace account was intended
from the outset to be “untethered” from clinical
recordsorcarepractices.
21TheadvancedHealthSpace
account offered potential for integration into a wider
care model through secure messaging and patient
access to the summary care record, but the new forms
of clinical interaction and wider organisational rou-
tines that advanced HealthSpace both presupposed
and required were not well worked out, nor were
thereformal plansto develop thesealongsidethe tech-
nology. In retrospect, the notion of HealthSpace as a
“datacontainer”tobe“deployed”ratherthanasacom-
ponent of a socio-technical network (and hence as an
opportunity for socio-technical change) was a serious
flaw in the original concept.
The original design work for HealthSpace occurred
before our evaluation began. People were apparently
asked what features they would like to see, but this fell
short of the detailed and iterative combination of eth-
nography,designandredesign,sometimescalledtech-
nomethodology, which is recommended to produce a
definitive user centred technology.
41-43 Our ethno-
graphic findings, although preliminary and limited to
people with diabetes, showed that HealthSpace’s
underlying design seems to align poorly with many
people’s self management practices, information
needs, and preferred styles of communication. Users
wanted more types of data, more functions, and more
flexible ways of sharing the data and linking with
health professionals. In contrast, My Health Manager
offers access to a much wider range of data (but does
not require the patient to enter these) and the Kaiser
package offers a range of ways of communicating with
clinicians. Compared with private sector or open
source products, HealthSpace also has limited poten-
tial for agile redesign in response to user feedback,
since content and functionality is controlled by the
state and software upgrades occur slowly and infre-
quently.
In terms of implementation and embedding, policy
makers seem to have treated HealthSpace as a “log on
andplay”technologyandassumedthatintendedusers
wouldneednopersuasiontotryitandnospecifictrain-
ing, support, or incentives to use it. But since UK
healthcare is free at the point of delivery, patients
may have thought they had nothing to gain by taking
on disease management activities currently done by
health professionals. The organisation and payment
structure of general practice in the United Kingdom
does not specifically incentivise email consultations,
whereas physicians working for Kaiser are paid per
encounter whether this occurs through email or face
to face. It is significant that many general practice
recordsystemsintheUnitedKingdomalreadyinclude
functionality for secure email communication with
patients, but few practices have enabled this and even
fewer use it routinely because of concerns about work-
load, social boundaries, and the risk of increasing
inequalities of access.
44-46 In contrast, it is established
practiceforpatientsintheUnitedStatestoinitiatecon-
tact with their physician by telephone or email.
Finally, in terms of readiness, interest in using any
form of personal health record currently seems to be
low in the United Kingdom.
2447 Anecdotally, patients
in the United Kingdom rarely seek access to either
paper or electronic health records. My Health Man-
agerwasintroducedinaverydifferentculturalcontext.
Insteadofprovidingacradletogravewelfarestate,the
United States expects citizens to understand their own
health needs and take out health insurance or actively
sign up to a public healthcare system.
The version of HealthSpace evaluated for this study
hadlowerfunctionalityandgreateraccesshurdlesthan
are intended for the next release (box 1). However, we
believe that low adoption rates are unlikely to be fixed
by upgrades to the software or by changes to the regis-
tration process because although HealthSpace as a
technology is evolving, HealthSpace as a programme
remains largely unchanged (a relatively non-customi-
sable, relatively untethered product that embodies
untested assumptions about the practice of self man-
agement), a technology-push implementation strategy
andahealthcaresystemwhosereadinessfortheradical
newservicemodeldepictedinfigure1isquestionable.
The HealthSpace programme seems to have lacked
severalcriticalsuccessfactors,whichbegsthequestion
ofwhythesewerenotidentifiedattheoutset,especially
sincealengthyofficialriskassessmentwasundertaken.
Onereasonappearstobethetechnicalandmanagerial
focus of early strategy documents. Patients were
depicted as passive recipients of HealthSpace’s bene-
fitsratherthanasactiveagentswhohaveopinions,feel-
ings,relationships,andvalues,whichmayexplainwhy
these human factors were not identified as mission cri-
tical to the programme’s success. Risk was assessed by
a highly formalised process in which quantitative
scores were assigned to policy makers’ subjective eva-
luations of different risks and summed to give an over-
allriskscore.Thismayhavelentaspuriousobjectivity
toestimatesofsuccessanddivertedattentionfromsys-
tematic qualitative methods such as defending the
ideas and plans in front of an audience. It is also possi-
ble that the original policy link with patient
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nology of legitimation”—that is, a mechanism by
which introduction of a centrally stored electronic
patient record system was made more politically
acceptable.
48
In conclusion, it is surely unsurprising that patient
engagement and motivation, along with the material
properties of the technology in use, have all proved
pivotal in the HealthSpace programme to date. The
findings of this study suggest that unless personal elec-
tronicrecordsaligncloselywithpeople’sattitudes,self
management practices, identified information needs,
and the wider care package (including organisational
routinesandincentivestructuresforclinicians),therisk
that they will be abandoned or not adopted at all is
substantial. As the NHS considers the next question
for such records, we suggest that conceptualising
them dynamically (as components of a socio-technical
network) rather than statically (as containers for data),
and applying user centred design principles more
explicitly, might improve their chances of adoption
and use.
This evaluation would not have been possible without the cooperation of
several people and organisations. Patients and staff in the various field
sitesallowedusaccesstotheirworkandexperiences,gavefreelyoftheir
time, and engaged with our desire to gain an honest, richly informed
account of events. The evaluation benefited from the Summary Care
RecordIndependentEvaluation(SCRIE)ExternalAdvisoryGroup,chaired
by lay member Jenni Bowley, which served as a diverse, critical, and
questioning audience for our emerging findings. Members(listedinfull in
our detailed report
25) included representatives from patient groups,
academic institutions, professional organisations, and Connecting for
Health. The study was part of the Connecting for Health Evaluation
Programme coordinated by Richard Lilford’s team at the University of
Birmingham. Academic colleagues too numerous to list provided
feedback and guidance throughout the study. We thank four BMJ
reviewers(HamishFraser,PeterSingleton,EnricoCoiera,andErwinKlein
Woolthuis)who made detailed commentson anearlier draft of the paper
and added additional insights and references.
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